ABSTRACT To fight against the evolving computer viruses, we must constantly inject new virus patches into the computer networks. This paper addresses the patch injection problem, i.e., the problem of developing a patch injection strategy to mitigate the negative impact of virus attacks. As the impact of an attack depends on not only the patch injection strategy but the unknown virus injection strategy, the patch injection problem is very complicated. This paper initiates the study of the patch injection problem by means of security economics and differential game theory. First, based on a novel virus-patch mixed propagation model, we model the original problem as a differential game. Second, we develop a method for finding a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the game, examine the structure of the candidate, and give some examples of the candidate. Furthermore, we demonstrate through comparative experiments that the candidate is better in terms of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. Therefore, we recommend the patch injection strategy in the candidate. Finally, we examine the effects of some factors on the performance of the recommended patch injection strategy. Overall, these findings undoubtedly have guiding significance to defense against virus infections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern society relies heavily on computer networks. On a daily basis, people acquire information through the Web, communicate with each other through online social networks, and buy goods through electronic payment [1] . However, computer networks as a double-edged sword are the paradise of computer virus as well. For instance, the recent Wanna Decryptor ransomware attack is estimated to have caused a total loss of four billion dollars [2] , [3] . What is worse, electronic virus is in perpetual evolution. As a matter of fact, currently available antiviruses are often insufficient to tackle future sophisticated viruses. Therefore, fighting against digital infections is a long and arduous task [4] , [5] .
To defend against evolving computer viruses, we must constantly develop new virus patches and inject them into computer networks [6] , [7] . In this setting, we need to develop a patch injection strategy to mitigate the negative impact of virus attacks. We refer to the problem of developing an effective patch injection strategy as the patch injection problem. As the impact of a virus attack depends on not only the patch injection strategy but the unknown virus injection strategy, the patch injection problem is very complicated. To our knowledge, the problem has not been tackled previously. This paper approaches this problem by means of two key theories: security economics and differential game theory. Below we give a brief review of the two theories.
Security economics is a powerful way of looking at overall system security [8] . As a complement to cybersecurity engineering approaches, security economics applies economic analysis to information security issues. By taking into account economic parameters, we can propose cybersecurity strategies that minimize risk exposure of systems and networks [9] , [10] .
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction between rational decision makers [11] . In the past decade, game theory has been widely applied to various aspects of cybersecurity [12] , [13] . For instances, [14] and [15] took the game-theoretic approach to address smart grid security and advanced persistent threat defense, respectively.
Differential game theory as a branch of game theory is devoted to the study of game-theoretic problems subject to continuous-time state evolution dynamics [16] . Different from static and repeated games [14] , [15] , differential games are played continuously in dynamic environments. In recent years, the differential game approach has been applied to some cybersecurity problems. Through the approach, [17] - [22] studied smart grid security, intrusion detection in cloud computing, auditing in cloud storage, malicious fog node identification, intrusion response in fog computing, and misinformation control, respectively. This paper takes the first step toward solving the patch injection problem by use of security economics and differential game theory. Our main contributions in this work are summarized as follows.
• We establish a virus-patch mixed propagation with patch injection. Thereby, we formulate the attacker's virus injection strategy and the network administrator's patch injection strategy, and we estimate the attack's expected impact as well as the attacker's expected net benefit. On this basis, we model the patch injection problem as a noncooperative differential game in which the goal of the administrator is to seek an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a virus injection strategy and a patch injection strategy.
• By use of differential game theory, we derive a method for finding a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. We then examine the structure of the candidate. Through comparison with a set of heuristic virus and patch injection strategies, we show that the candidate is better in terms of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. Therefore, we recommend the patch injection strategy in the candidate. Finally, we examine the effects of some factors on the performance of the candidate. These findings help to minimize the negative impact and potential consequence of virus attacks. The remainder of this paper is organized in this fashion. Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 models the patch injection problem as a differential game. Section 4 gives a method for finding a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the game and inspects its structure, and Section 5 evaluates the performance of the candidate. The effects of some factors on the performance of the candidate are examined in Section 6. Section 7 closes this work.
II. RELATED WORK
Computer virus propagation dynamics is a new applied mathematics aiming to understand the laws governing the spread of computer virus and thereby mitigate the impact of virus attacks [23] . Originally, the study was focused on virus propagation based on homogeneous networks [24] - [27] . In particular, as virus patches can be forwarded rapidly through computer networks [28] , [29] , a number of viruspatch mixed propagation models on homogeneous networks were proposed [30] - [33] . Later, the finding that many real-world networks are scale-free [34] , [35] set off a wave of research on virus propagation based on scale-free networks [36] , [37] . With the advance in wireless networking technology, today's computer networks may be deployed in any way [38] . To understand a variety of propagation phenomena on arbitrary computer networks, a number of propagation models based on arbitrary networks, which we refer to as node-level propagation models, have been suggested [39] - [43] . In particular, a node-level virus-patch mixed propagation model has recently been reported [44] .
As we know, patch forwarding has to be preceded by patch injection. However, all the above virus-patch mixed propagation models neglect patch injection. As a result, neither of them applies to the patch injection problem. In this paper, we introduce a node-novel virus-patch mixed propagation model with patch injection mechanism, which not only is in line with the actual situation but applies to the patch injection problem.
Based on the proposed virus-patch mixed propagation model, we estimate the expected impact of a virus attack as well as the expected net benefit of the attacker. On this basis, we model the patch injection problem as a differential game in which the attacker pursues the highest expected net benefit and the duty of the network administrator is to mitigate the expected impact.
Reference [17] proposed a differential game framework to demonstrate worst-case strategies for stealthy attacker to disrupt the transient stability of an electric power utility by leveraging control over distributed energy resources, showing that if the utility is able to identify uncompromised components, the impact of attack could be legitimated significantly. Reference [18] introduced and studied a differential game model for cloud intrusion detection. This work helps to improve the performance of cloud intrusion detection systems. Reference [19] established and studied a differential game model for cloud storage auditing. This work has potential application in enhancing the auditing level of cloud storage. Reference [20] proposed and studied a differential game model for identifying malicious nodes in fog computing environment. This work contributes to the promotion of fog computing security. Reference [21] suggested a differential game model for intrusion response in fog computing and derived a closed-form formula for closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game. Inspired by all of these work, our paper addresses a new problem (the patch injection problem) by means of differential game theory. In all of these work, the propagation of cyber attack through heterogeneous network is neglected. In sharp contrast to these work, our work is based on a heterogeneous network-based epidemic model, i.e., the nodelevel virus-patch mixed propagation model. Hence, our work matches the practice better.
Our work is closely related to [45] . In this paper, the viruscontaining problem was studied using game theory. However, this paper assumes the network is homogeneous, not complying with the actual situation. Worse still, this paper leaves patch injection out of consideration. In contrast, our work is grounded in reality and hence has good practical value.
Our work is related to [22] as well. In this paper, a differential game about misinformation control was proposed and studied. As the underlying spreading network of this game is highly averaged through the mean-field approach, the practical applicability of the recommended misinformation control strategy is questionable. Our work has been inspired by this work. However, in our paper the underlying spreading model of the differential game accommodates the complete information on the network topology and hence captures the virus-patch mixed spreading processes relatively accurately. As a result, the recommended patch injection strategy is expected to achieve a better performance.
III. THE PATCH INJECTION PROBLEM AND ITS MODELING
This paper addresses the following problem:
Patch injection problem: Develop a patch injection strategy to mitigate the negative impact of virus attacks.
For this purpose, in this section we model the problem by following these steps: (1) introduce terminologies and notations, (2) establish a state evolution model, (3) formulate the virus and patch injection strategies, (4) quantify the impact of the virus attack as well as the benefit of the attacker, and (5) model the patch injection problem.
A. BASIC TERMINOLOGIES AND NOTATIONS
Consider a computer network with the topology G = (V , E), where V = {1, 2, · · · , N } denotes the set of all the hosts (nodes) in the network, (i, j) ∈ E denotes that host i has access to host j. In this paper, we assume G is unchanged over time. Let A = a ij N ×N denote the adjacency matrix of G.
Suppose there is a cyber malefactor who keeps injecting new viruses into the network in the time horizon [0, T ]. To mitigate the impact of the virus attack, the network administrator has to constantly inject new patches into the network. Assume that at any time t ∈ [0, T ], each and every node in the network is either susceptible or infected or patched. Susceptible nodes are not infected with any virus but are vulnerable to the newest virus, because they have not received the newest patch. Infected nodes are infected with at least one virus. Patched nodes are not infected with any virus and are immune to the newest virus, because they have received the newest patch against the newest virus. Let X i (t) = 0, 1, and 2 denote the events that node i is susceptible, infected, and patched at time t, respectively. Then all X i (t) are random variables, and the random vector
stands for the state of the network at time t. Let Pr denote probability.
That is, S i (t), I i (t), and P i (t) denote the probabilities of node i being susceptible, infected, and patched at time t, respectively. As S i (t) = 1 − I i (t) − P i (t), the vector
stands for the expected state of the network at time t. 
B. A STATE EVOLUTION MODEL OF THE NETWORK
To model the patch injection problem, we need to model the evolution process of the network's expected state over time. To this end, let us introduce a set of rational hypotheses as follows (see Fig. 1 )
virus injection renders
the susceptible node i to become infected at time t at rate
coming from the infected node j renders the susceptible node i to become infected at time t at average rate β P a ji , where β P is a positive constant we refer to as the virus propagation rate. Hence, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , virus propagation renders the susceptible node i to become infected at time t approximately at average rate N j=1 β P a ji (t)I j (t). This hypothesis implies that virus propagation is a fully spontaneous process and hence is not under the control of the attacker. (H 3 ) For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , patch injection makes the unpatched node i to become patched at time t at rate
coming from the patched node j makes the unpatched node i to become patched at time t at average rate γ P a ji , where γ P is a positive constant we refer to as the patch forwarding rate. Hence, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , patch forwarding makes the unpatched node i to become patched at time t approximately at average rate N j=1 γ P a ji (t)I j (t). This hypothesis implies that patch forwarding is a fully spontaneous process and hence is not under the control of the network administrator. (H 5 ) For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the emergence of new virus renders the patched node i to become susceptible at time t at average rate δ, where δ is a positive constant we refer to δ as the patch failure rate. Remark 2: In practice, β P , γ P , and δ can be estimated by the network administrator through analyzing the historical data.
Combining the above hypotheses and based on differential dynamical system theory [46] , the network's expected state evolves approximately according to the following differential dynamical system:
with the initial condition E(0) = E 0 . We refer to the system as the Susceptible-Infected-Patched-Susceptible (SIPS) model.
C. THE VIRUS AND PATCH INJECTION STRATEGIES
The N -dimensional function x defined by
is under the control of the virus attacker. We refer to x as the virus injection strategy. The N -dimensional function y defined by
is under the control of the network administrator. We refer to y as the patch injection strategy. Let PC N [0, T ] denote the set of all the piecewise continuous N -dimensional functions on the interval [0, T ], and let us impose some restrictions on the virus and patch injection strategies as follows.
The hypothesis implies that the virus and patch injection strategies are easily implementable. Based on the above two hypotheses, the set of all the admissible virus injection strategies is
and the set of all the admissible patch injection strategies is
Let denote the interior of . We have the following preliminary result.
The proof of this lemma is left to Appendix A.
D. THE BENEFIT OF THE ATTACKER AND THE IMPACT OF THE VIRUS ATTACK
To model the patch injection problem, we need to quantify the benefit of the attacker as well as the impact of the virus attack. First, define the value of each node as the average loss per unit time suffered by the owner of the node. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , denote the value of node i as v i units (dollars, say).
Based on the hypothesis, the expected loss of the network in the time horizon
units. In what follows, we adopt the quantity as the measure of the loss of the network. Second, we quantify the cost for implementing a virus injection strategy. For this purpose, let us introduce the following hypothesis. (H 9 ) For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the cost per unit time for injecting viruses into the susceptible node i at the rate of β is φ i (β) units, where φ i (0) = 0, φ i is strictly increasing. Every φ i can be approximated by carrying out simulated virus injections with different rates and then generating a curve fitting all the simulated costs. Based on the hypothesis, the expected cost for implementing the virus injection strategy x is
units. Henceforth, we adopt the quantity as the measure of the cost for implementing the virus injection strategy x.
Combining the above discussions, we use the quantity
to measure the benefit of the attacker. Finally, let us measure the cost for implementing a patch injection strategy. To this end, we introduce the following hypothesis.
1) [(H 10 )] For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the cost per unit time for injecting patches into the unpatched node i at the rate of γ is ψ i (γ ) units, where ψ i (0) = 0, ψ i is strictly increasing. Every ψ i can be approximated by carrying out simulated patch injections with different rates and then generating a curve fitting all the simulated costs. Based on the hypothesis, the expected cost for implementing the patch injection strategy y is
units. From now on, we adopt this quantity as the measure of the cost for implementing the patch injection strategy y.
Combining the above discussions, we may use the quantity
to measure the impact of the virus attack.
E. THE MODELING OF THE PATCH INJECTION PROBLEM
Based on the previous discussions, the patch injection problem comes down to the problem of seeking a patch injection strategy y ∈ U P to mitigate J P (x, y). However, J P (x, y) is dependent on not only y but the unknown virus injection strategy x ∈ U V . This complicates the patch injection problem.
From the worst-case perspective, we may assume the attacker is aware of the loss of the network and attempts to maximize his benefit J V (x, y). In this setting, the solution concept of Nash equilibrium is relevant. A strategy pair (x * , y * ) ∈ U V × U P is referred to as a Nash equilibrium if
and
This implies that (a) when the network administrator sticks to the patch injection strategy y * , the attacker has to choose the virus injection strategy x * to maximize his benefit, and (b) when the attacker insists on x * , the administrator cannot reduce the impact of the virus attack by deviating from y * . Therefore, in the worst-case scenario the patch injection strategy y * is acceptable to the network administrator.
Combining the above discussions, we model the patch injection problem as the following noncooperative differential game:
Patch injection game: Suppose the attacker attempts to maximize J V (x, y), and the network administrator tries to minimize J P (x, y), where (x, y) ∈ U V × U P . Seek a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose (x * , y * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the patch injection game. We recommend the patch injection strategy y * to the network administrator. In the next section, we will try to solve the patch injection game.
IV. A STUDY OF THE PATCH INJECTION GAME
In this section, we study the patch injection game by means of differential game theory. First, we develop a method for seeking a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Second, we examine the structure of the candidate. Finally, we give some examples of the candidate.
A. SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
To develop a method for finding a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the game, we need to derive a necessary condition for the Nash equilibrium. This involves the following two Hamiltonians.
where
is the continuous and piecewise differentiable adjoint function.
We are ready to give the necessary condition. Theorem 1: Suppose (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of the patch injection game, E the solution to the associated SIPS model. Then there exist λ and µ with λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 such that the system (19) , as shown at the top of the next page, holds. Moreover,
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We refer to the system consisting of Eqs. (4), Eqs. (19)- (20), E(0) = E 0 , and λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 as the candidate system for the patch injection game, and the strategy pair obtained by solving the system as the candidate strategy-pair of the game, denoted (x CA , y CA ), because it is likely to be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Further, we refer to x CA and y CA as the candidate virus injection strategy and the candidate patch injection strategy, respectively.
Eqs. (19) imply that all disjoints rely on the network's expected states at all time. So, Eqs. (20)- (21) demonstrate that the candidate virus injection strategy and the candidate patch injection strategy both rely on the network's expected states at all time.
We shall invoke the Forward-Backward Sweep Method [47] to solve the candidate system to get the candidate strategy-pair of the patch injection game. The CS-FBS (abbreviation of candidate system forward-backward sweep) algorithm given below is a pseudo-code description of the method.
In all the following experiments, we will use the CS-FBS algorithm to solve the candidate system, where the convergence error = 10 −6 , the iteration bound K = 10 3 .
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CANDIDATE STRATEGY-PAIR
Now, let us examine the structure of the candidate strategy-pair of the patch injection game. Let (x, y) be the candidate strategy-pair, E the solution to the associated SIPS model, (λ, µ) the associated adjoints. For technical reason, we will show the following lemma in Appendix B.
Lemma 2:
For brevity, let
Below we present a set of four theorems characterizing the structure of the candidate strategy-pair. Theorem 2: Suppose φ i is concave. Then
Moreover, if
Theorem 3: Suppose φ i is differentiable and strictly convex. Then
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Algorithm 1 CS-FBS Input: patch injection game given by G PI
, E 0 , convergence error , iteration bound K . Output: strategy pair (x, y). 4: use the system (4) with x = x (0) , y = y (0) , and E(0) = E 0 to forwardly calculate E(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; 5: E (1) := E; 6: use the system (19) with x = x (0) , y = y (0) , E = E (1) , and λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 to backwardly calculate λ(t) and µ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; 7: λ (1) := λ, µ (1) = µ; 8: use the systems (20)- (21) with E = E (1) , λ = λ (1) , and µ = µ (1) to calculate x(t) and y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; 9: x (1) = x, y (1) = y; 10: 
use the system (4) with x = x (k) , y = y (k) , and E(0) = E 0 to forwardly calculate E(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
13:
:= E; 14: use the system (19) with x = x (k) , y = y (k) , E = E (k+1) , and λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 to backwardly calculate λ(t) and µ(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; 15: λ (k+1) := λ, µ (k+1) = µ; 16: use the systems (20)-(21) with E = E (k+1) , λ = λ (k+1) , and µ = µ (k+1) to calculate x(t) and y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;
17:
x (k+1) = x, y (k+1) = y; 18: end while 19: return(x (k+1) , y (k+1) ). 
Moreover, if
φ i (β i ) < v i + φ i (β i ) β i + γ i + max{β P , γ P }d − i ,(28)
then either (a) β I i (t) = β i for t ∈ [0, T ], or (b) there exists t i ∈ [0, T ) such that β I i is strictly decreasing in [0, t i ) and
Moreover, if 
then either (a)
Theorem 5: Suppose ψ i is differentiable and strictly convex. Then
Moveover, if
then either (a) γ i (t) = γ i for t ∈ [0, T ], or (b) there exists t i ∈ [0, T ) such that γ i is strictly decreasing in [0, t i ) and γ i (t) = γ i for t ∈ (t i , T ], or (c) there exist t
(1)
The proofs of the first two theorems are left to Appendixes C and D, respectively. The proofs of the last two theorems are omitted, because they are similar to those of the first two theorems, accompanied with tedious calculations.
C. EXAMPLES OF THE CANDIDATE STRATEGY-PAIR
Next, let us give some candidate strategy-pairs by solving the associated candidate systems.
Many real-world networks are small-world, i.e., they each admit a small diameter [48] . By using the Pajek software [49] , we get a synthetic small-world network G SW with N = 100 nodes, which is shown in Fig. 2 .
Example 1: Consider the pair of patch injection games with G
For the two games, the candidate virus and patch injection strategies for three nodes are plotted in Fig. 3(a)-(c) and Fig. 3(d)-(f) , respectively, agreeing with Theorems 2-5.
Many real-world networks are scale-free, i.e, they each approximately follow a power-law degree distribution [34] , [35] . By using Pajek [49] , we get a synthetic scale-free network G SF with N = 100 nodes, which is exhibited in Fig. 4 .
Example 2: For the two patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Example 1 except G = G SF , the candidate virus and patch injection strategies for three nodes are plotted in Fig. 5(a)-(c) and 5(d)-(f) , respectively, matching Theorems 2-5. Fig. 6 exhibits a subnet G FN with N = 100 nodes of the facebook network [50] . Fig. 7(a)-(c) and Fig. 7(d)-(f) , respectively, conforming to Theorems 2-5. 
Example 3: For the two patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Example 1 except G = G FN , the candidate virus and patch injection strategies for three nodes are exhibited in

V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE CANDIDATE STRATEGY-PAIR
In [18] - [21] , the closed-form formula of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium was given by analyzing the corresponding Bellman equation of each of the differential games. In [22] , an open-loop equilibrium of the proposed differential game was calculated numerically. In the previous section, we presented a method for finding a candidate for the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the patch injection game. Due to the inherent complexity of the game, it seems impossible to show that the game admits a Nash equilibrium. As a result, the candidate strategy-pair is probably not a Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the candidate strategy-pair through comparative experiments. This section is devoted to this work. For convenience, let (x CA , y CA ) denote the candidate strategy-pair.
A. A SET OF HEURISTIC VIRUS AND PATCH INJECTION STRATEGIES
For the comparison purpose, we give a set of heuristic virus/patch injection strategies as follows.
The first virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is to always achieve the highest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node. We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the highest rate (HR) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x HR (resp. y HR ). Formally,
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The second virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is to always achieve the lowest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node. We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the lowest rate (LR) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x LR (resp. y LR ). Formally,
The third virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is to always achieve a virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node that is linearly increasing with the out-degree of the node. We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the out-degree first (OF) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x OF (resp. y OF ). Formally, (35) where
a ij denotes the outdegree of node i, respectively.
The fourth virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is (1) to always achieve the highest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node in the time horizon[0, T /2), and (2) to always achieve the lowest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node in the time horizon[T /2, T ]. We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the high-low (HL) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x HL (resp. y HL ). Formally,
The fifth virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is to reduce the virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each susceptible (resp. unpatched) node linearly from the highest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate to the lowest allowable virus (resp. patch) injection rate. We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the linear descent (LD) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x LD (resp. y LD ). Formally, The sixth and last virus (resp. patch) injection strategy is to achieve a virus (resp. patch) injection rate of each node that is linearly increasing with the probability of the node being susceptible (resp. unpatched). We refer to the virus (resp. patch) injection strategy as the linear-feedback (LF) virus (resp. patch) injection strategy, denoted x LF (resp. y LF ). Formally,
(39)
B. COMPARATIVE EXPERIMENTS
Now, let us evaluate the performance of the candidate strategy-pair through a comparison with the proposed heuristic virus and patch injection strategies. Let
Experiment 1: Consider the pair of patch injection games with G
For the two games, J V (x, y CA ) (x ∈ A) and J P (x CA , y) (y ∈ B) are plotted in Fig. 8(a)-(b) and Fig. 8(c)-(d) , respectively. It is seen that (x CA , y CA ) is the best in terms of Nash equilibrium, provided (x, y) ∈ A × B.
Experiment 2: For the two patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Experiment 1 except G = G SF , J V (x, y CA ) (x ∈ A) and J P (x CA , y) (y ∈ B) are given in Fig. 9(a)-(b) and Fig. 9(c)-(d) , respectively. Again, (x CA , y CA ) is the best in terms of Nash equilibrium, provided (x, y) ∈ A × B. Fig. 10(a)-(b) and Fig. 10(c)-(d) , respectively. Also, (x CA , y CA ) is the best in terms of Nash equilibrium, provided (x, y) ∈ A × B.
Experiment 3: For the two patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Experiment 1 except G
We conclude from the above experiments that the strategypair (x CA , y CA ) is the best in terms of Nash equilibrium, provided (x, y) ∈ A×B. Further, we speculate that (x CA , y CA ) is a Nash equilibrium of the patch injection game.
Based on the above discussions, we find that the candidate patch injection strategy is likely to be superior to most heuristic patch injection strategies in terms of Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the candidate patch injection strategy is easily implementable, because it has a relatively simple structure. For instance, when all the conditions in Theorem 4 are met, the patch injection strategy of the corresponding node goes through a single jump from the highest allowable injection rate to the lowest allowable injection rate. Therefore, we recommend the candidate patch injection strategy to the network administrator.
One remarkable advantage of adopting the recommended patch injection strategy is that no matter what virus injection strategy the attacker uses, the impact of the virus attack can be controlled satisfactorily in the sense of Nash equilibrium solution concept.
In practice, the network administrator may divide the whole time horizon into a number of small time intervals. At the initial time point of each interval, he may collect and analyze recent virus reports to decide on the current expected state of the network. Then, he may apply the recommended patch injection strategy to the interval. Therefore, although the patch injection game per se is open-loop and hence lacks flexibility, the administrator is capable of managing the network in a closed-loop manner, further mitigating the negative impact of virus attacks.
VI. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
For an patch injection game, we refer to the attacker's benefit and the attack's impact associated with the candidate strategypair as the candidate benefit and the candidate impact, respectively. In this section, we examine the effects of some factors on the two quantities through computer experiments.
A. THE EFFECT OF THE ATTACK DURATION
First, we examine the effect of the attack duration T on the two candidate quantities. Fig. 11 exhibits the effect of T on J V (x CA , y CA ) and J P (x CA , y CA ).
Experiment 4: Consider the family of patch injection games with G
It is concluded from this experiment that the attacker's candidate benefit and the attack's candidate impact are both increasing with the attack duration. In practice, the network administrator should take measures to reduce the attack duration to mitigate its negative impact and potential consequence.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE COMMON VALUE
Second, suppose all the nodes in the network share a common value, and let us inspect the effect of the common value on the two candidate quantities. Fig. 12 shows the effect of v on J V (x CA , y CA ) and J P (x CA , y CA ).
expect T = 10 and v
From this experiment, we conclude that the attacker's candidate benefit and the attack's candidate impact are both increasing with the common value of all the nodes. Hence, the same virus attack has a greater impact on high-valued networks.
C. THE EFFECT OF THE VIRUS PROPAGATION RATE
Third, let us inspect the effect of the virus propagation rate β P on the two candidate quantities.
Experiment 6: Consider the family of patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Example 4 except T = 10 and β P ∈ {0.05, 0.1, · · · , 0.5}. Fig. 13 show the effect of β P on J V (x CA , y CA ), and J P (x CA , y CA ), respectively.
It is inferred from this experiment that the attacker's candidate benefit and the attack's impact are both increasing with the virus propagation rate. Therefore, virus attackers prefer to enhance the virus propagation rate to enhance their benefits.
D. THE EFFECT OF THE PATCH FORWARDING RATE
Next, we examine the effect of the patch propagation rate γ P on the two candidate quantities.
Experiment 7: Consider the family of patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Example 4 except T = 10 and γ P ∈ {0.05, 0.1, · · · , 0.5}. Fig. 14 shows the effect of γ P on J V (x CA , y CA ) and J P (x CA , y CA ).
It is concluded from this experiment that the attacker's benefit and the attack's impact are both decreasing with the patch forwarding rate. In practice, new patches should be forwarded as fast as possible to reduce the impact of virus attacks.
E. THE EFFECT OF THE PATCH FAILURE RATE
Finally, let us examine the effect of the patch failure rate δ on the two candidate quantities.
Experiment 8: Consider the family of patch injection games with the same parameters as those in Experiment 4 except T = 10 and δ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, · · · , 0.5}. Fig. 15 shows the effect of δ on J V (x CA , y CA ) and J P (x CA , y CA ).
From this experiment, we infer that the attacker's benefit and the attack's impact are both increasing with the patch failure rate. In reality, we should develop new patches with longer period of validity.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has addressed the issue of developing a patch injection strategy to minimize the impact of virus attacks. We have modeled the patch injection problem as a differential game in which the objective is to seek a Nash equilibrium. We have derived a candidate for the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game and have shown that the candidate is better in term of the Nash equilibrium solution concept. Therefore, we have recommended the patch injection strategy in the candidate.
There are some relevant research topics that are worth further investigation. First, the proposed patch injection strategy should be implemented in practice. Second, in this paper it is assumed that virus propagation and patch forwarding are both 58934 VOLUME 6, 2018 spontaneous processes. In the actual situation, the attacker is likely to get control of the virus propagation process to enhance his benefit, whereas the network administrator might control the patch forwarding process to reduce the impact of the virus attack. In this situation, we have to develop a patch injection-forwarding strategy to mitigate the impact of the attack, and this problem may be modeled as a more complicated differential game. Third, with the proliferation of mobile adhoc networks, the patch injection problem should be modified to adapt to the time-varying network situation [51] , [52] . Last, the methodology developed in this work could be applied to other areas of cybersecurity such as rumor control [53] , [54] , intrusion detection [55] , proactive cyber defense [56] , [57] , and privacy protection [58] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
It follows from the model (4) that
In view of the continuity of P(t), there exists t 0 ∈ (0, T ] such that 0 < P i (t) < 1 for all i and 0 < t ∈ (0, t 0 ]. We show that
On the contrary, suppose there exist i * and t * ∈ (t 0 , T ] such that (a) either P i * (t * ) = 0 or P i * (t * ) = 1, and (b)
If P i * (t * ) = 0, then
This implies that there exists t 1 ∈ [0, t * ) such that P i * (t 1 ) < 0, contradicting Eqs. (42) . Hence,
This implies that there exists t 2 ∈ [0, t * ) such that P i * (t 2 ) > 1, again contradicting Eqs. (42) . Hence, P i * (t * ) = 1. Therefore, Eqs. (41) hold. On this basis and by an analogous argument, we can show that I i (t) > 0, 0
The proof is complete.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to the Pontryagin Maximum/Minimum Principle [16] , there exist λ and µ such that for 1
Thus, Eqs. (19) follow by direct calculations. As the terminal cost is unspecified and the final state is free, we have the transversality condition λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0. Moreover, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we have
H V (E(t), x, y(t), λ(t)),
Eqs. (20)- (21) follow by direct calculations.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We prove only the first claim, because the remaining two claims can be shown analogously. By the first N equations of the system (19) and λ I (T ) = 0, we get
As λ I i is continuous, there exists t 0 ∈ [0, T ) such that λ I i (t) > 0 for all i and t ∈ (t 0 , T ). On the contrary, suppose there exist i * and t * ∈ [0, t 0 ] such that (a) λ I i * (t * ) = 0, (b) λ I i * (t) > 0 for t ∈ (t * , T ), and (c) λ I i (t) ≥ 0 for all i = i * and t ∈ (t * , T ). On one hand, (a) and (b) imply lim t→t * + 
A contradiction occurs. Therefore, the claim holds.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
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